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‘Ape Culture’ interrogated the relations 
and continuity between humans and their 
primate kin, and explored how apes have 
figured in human culture throughout history. 
Donna Haraway’s book Primate Visions: 
Gender, Race, and Nature in the World of Modern 
Science (1989) served as a theoretical linchpin 
for this exhibition, which featured artworks 
by Marcus Coates, Pierre Huyghe and 
Rosemarie Trockel, amongst others, as well as 
a separate display charting a history of apes 
in human culture and the development of 
primatology. 
In the exhibition catalogue, the curators 
observe that: ‘Situated at the threshold of 
humanity and animality, and thus of nature 
and culture, figures of apes do not merely 
serve as tokens marking these divisions, but 
[. . .] introduce slippage and ambiguity into 
these borders’.1 Indeed, apes have been 
used as surrogates for humans in medical 
experiments, cosmetics testing, space 
travel and even waiting tables, dissolving 
dichotomies of human/nonhuman animal 
and nature/culture, whilst simultaneously 
highlighting the unequal power relations 
inherent to these entanglements. Such 
reinforcement of evolutionary and 
behavioural continuity between humans and 
other primates can exhibit anthropomorphic 
tendencies, which undoubtedly serve to 
contribute to the ‘slippage’ and ‘ambiguity’ 
to which the exhibition’s curators refer.
Marcus Coates’s Degreecoordinates: Shared 
Traits of the Hominini (Humans, Bonobos and 
Chimpanzees) (2015) was a wall-mounted 
text installation made in collaboration with 
evolutionary anthropologist Volker Sommer. 
The pair posed over 300 questions to viewers 
based on behavioural traits exhibited across 
the Hominini subtribes. Including ‘Can you 
walk on two feet?’, ‘Do you feel joy?’ and 
‘Do you throw your shit?’, it is clear that 
when reading these questions, viewers would 
recognize such characteristics in themselves 
and other primates to differing degrees. The 
work highlighted a contradiction in the 
ways humans relate to other animals, since 
there is a tendency to divorce oneself from 
traits perceived as ‘animalistic’, yet readily 
attribute human qualities to other animals. 
Animal behaviourist John Kennedy has 
suggested that anthropomorphic thinking 
about animals is ‘built into us’, and that we 
‘could not abandon it even if we wished to’, 
making it all the more probable that we read 
the behaviour of nonhuman animals in terms 
of our own, despite the potential for error.2
Pierre Huyghe’s film Untitled (Human 
Mask) (2014) opened with a drone panning 
over a Japanese neighbourhood, deserted 
following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. 
The camera comes to rest inside a dank, 
abandoned restaurant. Sporting a dress 
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and long, dark hair, the film’s protagonist 
initially appears to be a young girl. However, 
it quickly becomes apparent that we are 
watching a monkey, dressed as a human with 
a wig and a mask. In fact, the primate in 
Huyghe’s film is a macaque, borrowed from 
a restaurant where the creature is usually 
found waiting tables. Despite any initial 
distaste at this crude anthropomorphism, 
as the film unfolds it becomes increasingly 
difficult to refrain from attributing human 
characteristics and sentiments to this 
creature. As the monkey moves around the 
restaurant, pausing, sitting and running, it 
is easy to project human feelings and even 
notions of human time upon the behaviour 
of this nonhuman animal: we wonder if the 
macaque is scared, bored, waiting and so on. 
Such a response can be described as ‘applied 
anthropomorphism’, in which we base our 
ideas and understanding of what it is like to 
be another living being –– whether human or 
nonhuman animal –– on our own perspective 
and experiences.3 Whilst anthropomorphism 
has faced charges of being unscientific, 
inaccurate, anthropocentric and reductive as 
a way of thinking about nonhuman animals, 
many have argued that it can promote 
productive and empathic interspecies 
relations, as long as we recognize and respect 
the ultimate difference of nonhuman animals 
and maintain an awareness that any such 
understanding can only go so far.4 
But we would do well to remember, as 
animal studies scholar Tom Tyler suggests, 
that anthropomorphism assumes we know 
what it means to be human.5 Two ink 
and gouache ape ‘portraits’ by Rosemarie 
Trockel, presented alongside her drawing 
of a woman wearing an ape mask, served 
to highlight how unstable this sense of self 
might be. Writing about the ape ‘portraits’ in 
another context, Anne Wagner observed that 
‘they forge an encounter that has [. . .] the 
immediacy of a social interaction; the looks 
the apes proffer, and we reciprocate, are full 
enough of interrogatives and uncertainty that 
we might say the exchange is staged to make 
us apes’.6 In such instances, it seems that 
human identity is far from firmly established.
Considering that many of the artworks 
included in this exhibition served to 
interrogate and disrupt any boundaries 
positioned between humans and nonhuman 
animals, and both the exhibition and 
catalogue expressed a conceptual affinity 
with the work of Donna Haraway, it seems 
a pity that ‘Ape Culture’ was presented in 
two distinct parts, with artworks on one side 
of the gallery and display panels featuring 
scientific and cultural documents on the 
other. Integrating these would have served 
to reinforce the dissolution of binaries that 
Haraway’s work holds so dear. Nevertheless, 
the displays were thoughtful and thought 
provoking, prompting viewers to reflect not 
only upon their relations with other animals, 
but also –– as eighteenth-century taxonomist 
Carl Linnaeus noted beside the Homo sapiens, 
which he finally resolved to place amongst 
the Primates –– nosce te ipsum: to know 
thyself.7
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